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Past Imperfect
Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-1-1113, 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B.
Apr. 11), appeal denied (Dec. 18, 2000).
During the course of Holocaust denier David Irving's libel action
against American historian Deborah Lipstadt and her publisher, Penguin
Books, press coverage frequently referred to the spectacle playing out in
England's High Court as "history on trial."' It would be closer to the mark,
though undeniably less catchy, to call it "historical methodology on trial."
The judge hearing the case, Justice Charles Gray of the Queen's Bench,
stressed this distinction in his opinion,2 where he relied on an "objective
historian" standard in judging Irving's scholarship. This standard had no
legal precedent; instead, it was based on the report submitted by one of the
defendants' expert witnesses, Richard J. Evans.' While this standard was
crafted for a British libel suit, I argue here for its rebranding as a
1. E.g., Jonathan Freedland, Court 73 Where History Is on Trial, GUARDIAN (London), Feb.
5, 2000, Home Pages, at 3; see also David Cesarani, Irving Exposed as a Liar with No Interest in
Pursuit of Truth, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at 16 ("A common misconception about the libel
case brought by David Irving against the American academic Deborah Lipstadt is that history was
on trial.").
2. Gray wrote:
I do not regard it as being any part of my function as the trial judge to make findings of
fact as to what did and what did not occur during the Nazi regime in Germany. It will
be necessary for me to rehearse, at some length, certain historical data. The need for
this arises because I must evaluate the criticisms of or (as Irving would put it) the attack
upon his conduct as an historian in the light of the available historical evidence. But it
is not for me to form, still less to express, a judgement about what happened. That is a
task for historians.
Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-1-1113, 2000 WL 362478, 1.3 (Q.B. Apr. 11), appeal
denied (Dec. 18, 2000).
3. Richard J. Evans, Expert Witness Report, Irving, 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B.) [hereinafter
Evans, Report]. Evans was one of a number of expert historical witnesses employed by Penguin
Books. RICHARD J. EVANS, LYING ABOUT HITLER: HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND THE DAVID
IRVING TRIAL 29-30 (2001) [hereinafter EVANS, LYING].
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"conscientious historian" standard and for its application in American
cases employing historians as expert witnesses.
I
David Irving, a British historian of Nazi Germany, brought a libel suit
against Deborah Lipstadt, Dorot Professor of Modern Jewish History and
Holocaust Studies at Emory University, and her publisher, Penguin Books,
based on references to Irving in Lipstadt's book, Denying the Holocaust:
The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory.4 In her book, Lipstadt quoted
other scholars who have described Irving as "a 'Hitler partisan wearing
blinkers' and accused him of distorting evidence and manipulating
documents to serve his own purposes." 5 Irving, Lipstadt concluded, "is one
of the most dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial. Familiar with
historical evidence, he bends it until it conforms with his ideological
leanings and political agenda." 6 Irving went to court, claiming that the book
was part of a "concerted attempt to ruin his reputation as an historian," and
sought damages.7 Under the peculiar libel law regime that makes England a
libel plaintiffs paradise, Irving's action shifted the burden to Lipstadt and
Penguin to demonstrate the truth of their assertions.8 Penguin invested £2.5
million in an ambitious research project to prove Lipstadt's accusations,
employing a team of historians to scour Irving's works.9
The trial was extremely controversial. At one point, Irving, who
represented himself in this bench trial, referred to Justice Gray as "Mein
Fifhrer," apparently unconsciously.' Other testimony dealt with a nursery
rhyme Irving composed for his daughter: "I'm a Baby Aryan/ Not Jewish
or Sectarian/ I have no plans to marry-an/ Ape or Rastafarian." " While
congratulating Irving for skillful presentation of his case (and politely
4. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH
AND MEMORY (1993).
5. Id. at 161 (quoting Martin Broszat, Hitler und die Genesis der 'Endlosung' [Hitler and the
Genesis of the 'Final Solution'], 25 VIERTEAJAHRSHEFTE FOR ZEITGESCHICHTE 739, 742 (1977)).
6. Id. at 181.
7. Irving, 2000 WL 362478, 1.2.
8. See Dennise Mulvihill, Irving v. Penguin: Historians on Trial and the Determination of
Truth Under English Libel Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 221
(2000).
9. Vikram Dodd, How the Web of Lies Was Unravelled, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 12, 2000,
Home Pages, at 4.
10. Trial Transcript, Day 32, at 193 (Mar. 15, 2000), Irving, 2000 WL 362478; EVANS,
LYING, supra note 3, at 224; Dodd, supra note 9, at 4. One observer pointed out that Gray once or
twice referred to Irving as Hitler. Ian Buruma, Blood Libel, NEW YORKER, Apr. 16, 2001, at 83.
11. Irving, 2000 WL 362478, 9.6; David Pallister, "He Is a Holocaust Denier. He
Misstated Evidence"; The Judgment Judge Condemns Deliberate Falsification of Historical
Record, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 12, 2000, Home Pages, at 6.
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overlooking his Freudian slip), Gray nonetheless resoundingly found in
favor of Lipstadt and Penguin in a lengthy opinion, concluding:
Irving has for his own ideological reasons persistently and
deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence;
that for the same reasons he has portrayed Hitler in an
unwarrantedly favourable light, principally in relation to his
attitude towards and responsibility for the treatment of the Jews;
that he is an active Holocaust denier; that he is anti-semitic and
racist and that he associates with right wing extremists who
promote neo-Nazism.' 2
The worldwide relief following Gray's verdict was almost palpable.1
3
The verdict was widely interpreted as a defeat for Holocaust denial, but
the defendants' strategy at trial emphasized Irving's methodology, not his
conclusions. By focusing narrowly on Irving's evaluation of evidence, the
defense laid the groundwork for Gray's sweeping verdict. First, the
defense's concentration on interpretation resonated with the affinity of the
judge and the historian as evaluators of documentary evidence. 4 By
presenting Irving's failure as a systematic misjudgment of the historical
record, the defendants encouraged Gray to contrast his own experience and
instincts as a trial judge with Irving's use of evidence. The result, not
surprisingly, was unfavorable to Irving. Second, by stressing evidentiary
standards, the defense engaged Irving, and by extension the Holocaust
deniers as a group, on his own territory. Holocaust denial over the past
three decades has often presented itself in pseudoscholarly garb, clothed in
footnotes and other academic niceties. 5 In particular, Holocaust denial has
specialized in spurious assertions that it applies a more rigorous standard to
historical evidence than do scholars who assert the Holocaust occurred.
16
12. Irving, 2000 WL 362478,$ 13.167.
13. See, e.g., Douglas Davis et al., British Court Slams Irving as Holocaust Denier,
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 12, 2000, at 1; Vikram Dodd, Irving: Consigned to History as a Racist
Liar, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 12, 2000, Home Pages, at 1; Sarah Lyall, Critic of Holocaust
Denier Is Cleared in British Libel Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at Al.
14. Cf. Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, in QUESTIONS
OF EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 290, 290-94
(James Chandler et al. eds., 1994) (noting the long history of comparisons between history and
law, and between historians and judges). Gray tried to keep distinct the roles of judge and
historian. As he told a journalist before the trial, "There is some risk of one's being asked to
become a historian. Judges aren't historians." D.D. Guttenplan, Why History Matters, GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 15, 2000, at 1. Nonetheless, his opinion is at its most assured when he criticizes
Irving's use of evidence. Not being a historian for Gray seems to have amounted to not producing
a historical narrative; he did not shrink from evaluating historical methodology.
15. RICHARD J. EVANS, IN DEFENCE OF HISTORY 238-43 (1997); LIPSTADT, supra note 4, at
24; DIANE PURKISS, THE WITCH IN HISTORY: EARLY MODERN AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY
REPRESENTATIONS 70 (1996).
16. Evans, Report, supra note 3, 1 2.5.35 (discussing an article by Prof. David Cannadine
reviewing Irving's work)- see also EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 106-07 (describing the
15332001]
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By attacking Irving's use of evidence, therefore, the defense struck at the
very heart of Holocaust denial.
II
While Gray's opinion has received extensive praise for its definitive
rebuke of Holocaust denial, the route by which he reached this end has
scarcely been discussed. 7 Drawing on Evans's report, Gray created an
"objective historian" standard, a fictional embodiment of common sense
somewhat reminiscent of the "man on the Clapham omnibus" standard
traditionally used in English law.'" Gray found that Irving's departures from
the "objective historian" standard were substantial: "Irving has misstated
historical evidence; adopted positions which run counter to the weight of
the evidence; given credence to unreliable evidence and disregarded or
dismissed credible evidence." ,"
Justice Gray did not explicitly formulate a test for "objective historian"
status separate from his criticisms of Irving's conduct in particular
instances." Nonetheless, by putting together Gray's criticisms of Irving and
Evans's summary of "generally accepted standards of historical
scholarship," 2 one can distill a code of conduct for the objective historian:
"pseudo-academic" form of Holocaust denier Arthur Butz's works, including his use of
footnotes, appendices, and plates and diagrams).
17. But see Tony Judt, Writing History, Facts Optional, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at A31
("But what of the 'objectivity' dilemma?"); Anne McElvoy, Unfortunately, Holocaust Denial
Will Not End Here, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 12, 2000, at 3 ("The most intriguing question
raised by the evidence was the judge's claim that Mr Irving's increasing political activism
disqualified him from his claim to be a serious 'objective' historian. This is marshy ground on
which to pitch an argument and a sign that legal minds do not always grasp the pitfalls of referring
matters to the deceptive higher court of objectivity.").
18. 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 272 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "Clapham"); see also
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 15 (1965) (equating the "man in the Clapham
Omnibus" with the reasonable man, and noting it is an "archaism familiar to all lawyers").
19. Irving, 2000 WL 362478,1 13.140.
20. Id. 1 13.1-13.168.
21. In his report, Evans summarized these standards:
[D]oes Irving give a reasonably accurate account of the documents he uses; does he
translate them in a reasonably accurate and unbiased manner; does he take into account
as many other relevant documents as any professional historian could reasonably be
expected to read and cite when he is using one particular source to substantiate an
argument; does he apply consistent criteria of source-criticism to all the original
material he uses, examining it for internal consistency, its consistency with other
documents, its provenance, the motives of those who were responsible for it, and the
audience for which it was intended; are his arguments, his statistics and his accounts of
historical events consistent across time and based on reliable historical evidence; does
he take account of the arguments and interpretations of other historians who have
examined the same documents; does he, in other words, advance his arguments in a
reasonably objective and unbiased manner?
Evans, Report, supra note 3, 1.6.4.
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(1) She must treat sources with appropriate reservations; 2 (2) she must not
dismiss counterevidence without scholarly consideration; 23 (3) she must be
even-handed in her treatment of evidence and eschew "cherry-picking" ;24
(4) she must clearly indicate any speculation; 25  (5) she must not
mistranslate documents or mislead by omitting parts of documents;26 (6) she
must weigh the authenticity of all accounts, not merely those that contradict
her favored view; 27 and (7) she must take the motives of historical actors
into consideration.28
III
This "objective historian" standard may in fact be more useful in
America than in its country of origin. The "turn to history" in American
jurisprudence 29 has created an increase in the number of prominent cases
employing historical arguments. 30 This Case Note focuses on the testimony
22. See, for example, Irving, 2000 WL 362478, IN 13.13, 5.34-5.47, in which Gray faulted
Irving for uncritical reliance on crime statistics taken from the work of Kurt Daleuge, an
enthusiastic member of the Nazi party.
23. See, for example, id. IM 13.17, 5.40-5.72, in which Gray reprimanded Irving for being
"unduly uncritical" of witness statements by Hitler's adjutants supporting Irving's account,
statements which were contradicted by contemporaneous documentary evidence, including
Goebbels's diary and police telegrams.
24. See, for example, id. 1[ 13.24-13.25, 5.111-5.122, in which Gray criticized Irving's
selective treatment of the evidence regarding the shooting of Jews in Riga. Irving relied on an
order prohibiting future mass shootings to argue that the Germans had called a halt to the
shootings, while ignoring evidence from the same source that the order was limited to shootings
"on that scale" and called for increased discretion in shootings, implying that the shootings were
to continue.
25. See, for example, id. 9[ 13.22, 5.90-5.110, in which Gray found that Irving misled readers
by presenting Himmler's notes as incontrovertible evidence supporting Irving's proposition that
Hitler had prohibited the general liquidation of Jews, and that this amounted to speculation, rather
than recitation of established facts.
26. Id. 91 13.31 ("Irving has seriously misrepresented Hitler's views on the Jewish question.
He has done so in some instances by misinterpreting and mistranslating documents and in other
instances by omitting documents or parts of them.").
27. See, for example, id. T 13.117-13.125, 11.6-11.48, in which Gray condemned Irving for
relying on one document to support his claims for an inflated casualty figure for the Allied
bombing of Dresden, and for ignoring "powerful reasons for doubting [its] genuineness,"
including accusations of forgery and internal evidence of alterations.
28. See, for example, id. [91 13.42-13.45, 5.199-5.214, in which Gray faulted Irving for failing
to consider Hitler's motives when using accounts of his meetings with Antonescu and Horthy
during which Hitler was apparently motivated by a desire to control the fates of Hungarian and
Romanian Jews.
29. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132 (1996).
30. One manifestation of this shift has been the historians' briefs, or historical segments of
briefs, directed at the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Self-Advocates Becoming
Empowered at 3-10, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (No. 99-
1240); Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v.
Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605). For the debate regarding the historians'
brief in Webster, see Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy, PUB.
HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 27; Michael Grossberg, The Webster Brief: History as Advocacy, or
Would You Sign It? PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 45; Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger,
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1531
of historians serving as expert witnesses at the trial level. Historians have
testified in a range of cases: Indian rights;31 land claims; 32 gender
discrimination;33 deportation of alleged Holocaust participants; 34 voting
rights;35 and gay rights,36 among others. Yet, historians called upon to
testify claim that the standards applied by courts in assessing their
testimony are contradictory or irrational.37
Historians are not alone among social scientists and other non-scientific
experts in confronting an absence of coherent standards.38 The judicial
guidelines for evaluation of expert testimony have undergone substantial
redefinition over the past decade. Beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.39 in 1993, the Court abandoned the longstanding
Frye test, which looked to "general acceptance in the particular field."' 4
Instead, the Court proposed a list of factors for the trial court to consider
including: whether a technique or theory can be (or has been) tested; 41
whether it has been subject to peer review and publication;" its known or
"That's Not History," PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 33; and James C. Mohr, Historically
Based Legal Briefs, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 19.
31. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Baca, 844 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Dupris, 612 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1979); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F.
Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994), affd 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Michigan, 471 F.
Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979); Helen Hornbeck Tanner, History vs. the Law: Processing Indians
in the American Legal System, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 693 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Denson v. Stack, 997 F.2d 1356 (11 th Cir. 1993).
33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). The Sears case
also gave rise to heated controversy. See, e.g., Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic
Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1629 (1988);
Alice Kessler-Harris, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: A Response to Haskell and
Levinson, 67 TEX. L. REV. 429 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dailide, 953 F.
Supp. 192 (N.D. Ohio 1997); United States v. Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1996); United
States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
35. See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); Irby v. Fitz-
Hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D.
Ala. 1986); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Peyton McCrary, Yes,
but What Have They Done to Black People Lately? The Role of Historical Evidence in the
Virginia School Board Case, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1275 (1995); Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald
Hebert, Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as Expert Witnesses in Southern
Voting Rights Cases, 16 S.U. L. REV. 101 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487, 489 (Ky. 1993).
37. See, e.g., Peter Charles Hoffer, "Blind to History": The Use of History in Affirmative
Action Suits, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 272 (1992); N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Historians
and the Impeachment Imbroglio: In Search of a Serviceable History, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 473, 486
(2000); Tanner, supra note 31.
38. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 555 (1977), reprinted in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY 499 (Peter Sack ed.,
1992).
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
40. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
42. Id.
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potential rate of error when applied;43 existence and maintenance of
standards and controls;" and general acceptance.45 These factors, however,
were not presented as a "definitive checklist" but rather as "observations"
for the trial court to consider.46 The inquiry, the Court noted, should be a
"flexible one."4 7 Moreover, it should focus on methodology rather than
conclusions."
The Court's decision in Daubert, as commentators quickly pointed out,
left unresolved the question of whether the new test for expert testimony
encompassed specialized knowledge or social science evidence as well
as scientific evidence.4 9 In Kumho, the Court expanded trial courts'
"gatekeeping" function to all expert testimony," but again emphasized the
flexibility of the inquiry, concluding "we can neither rule out, nor rule in,
for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in
Daubert." 5 Most recently, the December 2000 amendment of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 codified the focus on methodology present in both
Daubert and Kumho.52
While Kumho may have resolved the debate over Daubert's scope, it
did little to clarify how Daubert's factors might be applied to social science
evidence. In some cases, lower courts have been frustrated in their attempt
43. Id. at 594.
44. Id. Although this factor is not listed separately in many accounts of Daubert, I follow the
most recent Advisory Committee's note to Rule 702 in describing it as a fifth factor. FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
46. Id. at 593.
47. Id. at 594.
48. Id. at 595; Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating
that the inquiry as to the admissibility of expert testimony must focus solely on principles and
methodology, not on conclusions that they generate (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595)); see also
Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 869
(1994) ("It's The Methodology, Stupid!"). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997) (upholding the trial court's inquiry into an expert's conclusions).
49. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994); see also Teresa S. Renaker, Evidentiary Legerdemain: Deciding
When Daubert Should Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1996)
(questioning the applicability of Daubert to psychological evidence).
50. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999); Marc N. Garber, Opening
Daubert's Gate: Testing the Reliability of an Expert's Experiences After Kumiho, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2000, at 4; Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
"Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000).
51. 526 U.S. at 150. The Court went on to say that it also consciously refrained from making
a definitive judgment of the applicability of Daubert factors "for subsets of cases categorized by
category of expert or kind of evidence. Too much depends on the particular circumstances of the
particular case." Id.
52. The recent amendment of Rule 702 provides, in part, for the admission of expert
testimony if "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702. The Advisory Committee's note
indicates that the revision was prompted by Daubert and Kumho. Id. advisory committee's note.
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to apply the Daubert factors to certain disciplines, including the social
sciences.5 3 The listed factors appear to be particularly ill-suited to
evaluation of historical expert testimony.
Consider, for a moment, an evaluation of Irving's work under the
Daubert factors. The decision in Daubert was motivated in part by a desire
to exclude "junk" science. Would its factors exclude "junk" history as
well? Testability, the first factor, does not apply to historical scholarship in
anything like the traditional controlled laboratory sense no doubt
envisioned by the Court. At best, another historian could (as the Penguin
team did) revisit all of the sources a colleague cited. In the Irving case,
testing of this sort revealed a pattern of questionable interpretations, but did
so at an impractically great cost, in both time and money.54 Daubert's
second factor, publication and peer review, does not help separate Irving's
work from acceptable historiography. Irving's books have been released by
reputable publishing houses and have received favorable reviews from
other German historians." The third factor, a known or potential rate of
error, meanwhile, is completely inapplicable as a standard for evaluating
historical scholarship. History's focus on past events means that it does not
generate predictions that can be verified or disproved. The fourth Daubert
factor, existence of standards, requires further development before it can be
used to distinguish Irving's work. History, unlike professions such as law or
medicine, does not have widely recognized codes of conduct. Its
methodological standards are more implicit than explicit. The Irving case,
however, showed that it is possible to arrive at a serviceable definition of
these standards for legal purposes. Finally, the fifth factor, general
acceptance, raises further questions. While scholarly reviews may be
pressed into service as a gauge of general acceptance, the Irving example
demonstrates their failings as a test for methodological reliability.
This exercise reveals that the Daubert factors cannot be applied to
historical scholarship without a great deal of assistance from historians. As
in the Irving case, Daubert inquiries would depend on participation by
members of the historical profession, who would need to make their own
methodological standards explicit, and to enumerate specific instances in
which the testimony in question departs from those standards. Making
53. See, e.g., Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
factors mentioned by the Court in Daubert do not neatly apply to expert testimony by a
sociologist).
54. Also, the thorny question of distinguishing between fact and interpretation limits the
usefulness of testing. Cf H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 683
(1987) ("History yields interpretations, not uninterpreted facts."). Daubert's mandated focus on
methodology, not conclusions, would tend to insulate conclusions from scrutiny. In the Irving
case, however, it was only by considering interpretations in tandem with evidence that the
Penguin team could demonstrate Irving's errors.
55. EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 8-9. Evans does note, however, that few of these reviews
came from scholars whose expertise was precisely in Irving's specialty.
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sense of Daubert, in short, requires discipline-centered methodologies and
standards.56 The standard developed in Irving v. Penguin Books, therefore,
can fill a new niche in American evidence law because historians,
particularly Evans, were instrumental in shaping it.
57
But to use the standard developed in the Irving trial necessarily
transforms it from an expert witness's testimony in a libel trial about a
historian's reputation to a standard for evaluating expert evidence on
historical questions. While Gray's "objective historian" standard may have
been used to judge Irving as a historian,58 that is not the use I envision for it
in cases in which historians appear as expert witnesses. Gray's standard
should not be used for settling scholarly controversies59 or for establishing a
benchmark outside which historians might fear legal liability. Instead, as
presented in this Case Note, it is intended as a guide for judges. Given that
Daubert places increased responsibility on judges to serve as gatekeepers
by excluding questionable expert testimony, Gray's standard would enable
them to make better-informed assessments of historical evidence before
them.6" Application of Gray's standard should have inclusionary, not
exclusionary, consequences: As long as a historian's methodology satisfies
its criteria, his or her testimony should be considered by the judge.
Like many immigrants of an earlier era, however, Gray's standard may
find its passage into American society eased by a name change. In keeping
with Gray's own language, a better name would be the "conscientious
56. See Imwinkelried, supra note 49, at 2274; Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An
Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 238-41 (2000); Standards
and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence After Daubert, 157 F.R.D.
571, 578-80 (1994); see also Hoffer, supra note 37, at 273 ("Judges should read historical
evidence and assess historical argument the way that historians fashion historical evidence
and construct historical arguments."); Rosen, supra note 38, at 569, reprinted in LAW
AND ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 38, at 513 (suggesting discipline-authored standards for
anthropological testimony).
57. See EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 192 ("Despite the fact that the defense case was
conducted in masterly fashion by one of Britain's top defamation Q[ueen's] C[ounsel]s, who
seemed to know what was in the expert reports better than we did ourselves, the main role in
drawing up the defense case was ultimately played by the historians.").
58. Gray rejected outright Evans's argument that Irving was not a historian at all. Evans had
argued that Irving's abuses of evidence meant that he could not be considered a historian. Evans,
Report, supra note 3, T 1.6.11. But Gray instead gave Irving qualified praise for his work in
military history. Irving, 2000 WL 362478, 13.7.
59. Many commentators on the Irving trial expressed discomfort with the spectacle of
scholars resorting to court. See, e.g., EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 6 ("Historians do not usually
answer such criticisms by firing off writs. Instead, they normally rebut them in print."); Neal
Ascherson, Holocaust Denial: The Battle May Be Over but the War Goes On, OBSERVER
(London), Apr. 16, 2000, News, at 19 (" [A]n English libel court is for justice, not for history.").
60. Other scholars have attempted to teach courts how to do history. See, e.g., Buckner F.
Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 377 (1998); Powell, supra note 54; see also Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (trying to teach constitutional
scholars how to do history). The "conscientious historian" standard, however, directs attention to
the specific details and protocols of dealing with historical evidence, rather than historical
thinking on a more general level.
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historian" standard."' The quest for absolute historical objectivity has been
called into question convincingly,62 and, as a result, the label "objective"
appears both naive and misguided. But the idea of objectivity is not at all
central to Gray's standard. Gray's use of the word "objective" results from
the specific requirements of the libel defense in the Irving case. The
components of Gray's standard do not, in fact, call for the historian to be
without personal opinions or inclinations; they merely require him or her to
make a balanced assessment of the evidence.63 Moreover, in their own
scholarly publications, both Evans and Lipstadt make it clear that historians
can and will have political convictions regarding their fields of study. 
6 4
IV
How might the newly rebranded "conscientious historian" standard
work in practice? Its main benefit would be to focus analysis of historical
testimony more clearly on the historian's use of evidence.65 In this capacity,
the "conscientious historian" standard could serve several purposes: It
would discourage dismissal of evidence based simply on the historian's
holding convictions about his or her subject matter; it would give judges a
more nuanced understanding of what historians should and should not be
expected to testify to on the stand; and it would combat the tendency of
historians on either side of a case to present unduly one-sided conclusions.
Most of the abuses described below are no doubt outliers, but they suggest
the dangers inherent in operating without any type of standard at all.
American historians and legal scholars have wrestled with the question
of whether serving as an expert witness inevitably compromises a
historian's objectivity.' Some judges, meanwhile, have taken a particularly
61. E.g., Irving, 2000 WL 362478, 13.51.
62. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988); Ginzburg, supra note 14, at 294-96; see also JOYCE
APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 241-70 (1994) (discussing the "many-
pronged attack" on objectivity since the 1960s).
63. Cf Guttenplan, supra note 14 (" Irving's problem wasn't detachment but dishonesty.").
64. EVANS, supra note 15, at 249-52; EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 249-50; LIPSTADT,
supra note 4, at 25-26 ("[T]here is increasing recognition that the historian brings to this
enterprise his or her own values and biases.").
65. Theoretically, it could be used both in the decision whether an individual historian should
be considered an expert, and in the assessment of the historian's testimony; however, it seems
unlikely to be used to prevent historians from testifying in the first place. Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the standards for qualifying as an expert are extremely inclusive: "a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." FED. R. EVID. 702.
66. See, e.g., Carl M. Becker, Professor for the Plaintiff: Classroom to Courtroom, PUB.
HISTORIAN, Summer 1982, at 69, 77; S. Charles Bolton, The Historian as Expert Witness:
Creationism in Arkansas, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1982, at 59; Daniel A. Farber, Adjudication
of Things Past: Reflections on History as Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1009 (1998); Peter Irons,
Clio on the Stand: The Promise and Perils of Historical Review, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 337, 349-54
(1988); J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in
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stringent approach to the question of objectivity, rushing to discount the
testimony of historians as expert witnesses based on their political
commitments. In the remanded Virginia Military Institute case,67 for
example, it appears that the judge completely disregarded a prominent and
well-qualified historian's testimony on women's history because he
admitted membership in a profeminist group on cross-examination.68 The
"conscientious historian" standard would caution judges against such
an approach, directing attention away from the historian's political
convictions. Given the prominence of Irving's political and racial beliefs at
his trial, this result may appear paradoxical. The decision in Irving,
however, turned on the pattern of Irving's errors.69 His personal beliefs and
political engagements were never taken as conclusive evidence of historical
unreliability. Similarly, in the absence of any demonstrated errors, the
feminist historian's testimony should have been considered.
The "conscientious historian" standard would also prevent confusion
resulting from the multiple roles historians play in the witness-box, ranging
from authenticators of old newspapers to experts testifying on the basis of
years of wide-ranging research in the sources of a particular historical
period. While newspaper authentication is one role performed by historians,
historical expertise should not be misinterpreted as a generalized ability to
recreate the past from isolated clippings. In a particularly egregious abuse
of expert testimony in one voting rights case, a historian, whose specialty
was Civil War and Reconstruction-era constitutional history, concluded,
solely on the basis of newspaper clippings shown to him on the stand, that
the adoption of at-large elections in the 1960s was not racially motivated.7"
The "conscientious historian" standard would have barred this testimony
on several grounds: First, the testimony violated the principle of
consideration of as much of the relevant evidence as possible; second, it
invited speculation; and, third, it failed to give due consideration to the
motives of historical actors.
Scholarship and Expert Witnessing, PUB. HISTORIAN, Winter 1984, at 5; see also Paul Soifer, The
Litigation Historian: Objectivity, Responsibility, and Sources, PUB. HISTORIAN, Spring 1983, at
47, 48-53 (discussing the risks to objectivity of historians doing research under contract to
lawyers).
67. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th
Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
68. Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence:
Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REV. L, & WOMEN'S
STUD. 189, 279 (1996) (describing the judge's decision to disregard Michael Kimmel's testimony
in the remand hearing of the Virginia Military Institute case); see also NAACP v. City of Niagara
Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1020 (2d Cir. 1995) (agreeing with the district court's decision to disregard
the evidence of plaintiffs expert historian based, in part, on her "vehement opposition to at-large
districts under any circumstances").
69. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
70. McCrary & Hebert, supra note 35, at 115-16.
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Another benefit of the "conscientious historian" standard would be to
discourage historians from being unduly one-sided in their interpretations.
One-sidedness in historical testimony need not result from an attempt to
mislead; it may very well represent an understandable response to the
perceived adversarial norms of the courtroom that are reinforced through
the process of selecting expert witnesses.71 One historian who participated
in writing the Webster brief, for example, recounted deliberately avoiding
topics that would complicate the historical narrative being presented. The
critique of one-sidedness has a long history in American legal scholarship.
Alfred Kelly, in one of the pioneering discussions of historiography in the
Supreme Court, famously called it "law-office history," explaining that
"[b]y 'law-office history,' I mean the selection of data favorable to the
position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data
or proper evaluation of the data proffered." 73 Irving's manipulation of
history, by this standard, represents a paradigmatic example of law-office
history. Traditionally, cross-examination has been advanced as the proper
counterweight to one-sidedness in expert testimony. 74  But cross-
examination itself is likely to encourage violation of the "conscientious
historian" standard; for example, by pulling quotations out of context for
impeachment purposes.75 Moreover, Daubert seems implicitly to move the
obligation to ensure reliability away from cross-examination and toward the
judge.
Responsibility for law-office history in the form of expert testimony
should not be placed on the litigants and their expert witnesses alone,
however. As long as judges expect a winner-take-all adversarial
presentation of history, they must share the blame. Judges and litigants
alike must revise their expectations of what a historical narrative would
look like under the "conscientious historian" standard. Taking into account
all of the evidence, and eschewing cherry-picking, means that parties
should not be expected to present cases in which all the historical evidence
unproblematically supports their legal position.76
7 1. For a description of how the selection of expert witnesses reinforces and inculcates one-
sidedness, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1126-36.
72. Freedman, supra note 30, at 28-3 1.
73. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122
n. 13. See generally William Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the
Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988) (expanding Kelly's typology).
74. Gross, supra note 71, at 1165-76.
75. Alice Kessler-Harris, a prominent women's historian, complained after the controversial
Sears case that opposing counsel had tried to discredit her analysis of gender relations in the
1970s with quotations from Kessler-Harris's previously published work. Those quotations,
however, described American society in the antebellum period. Kessler-Harris, supra note 33, at
432.
76. Cf Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521,
538 (1989) (praising Eric Foner for refusing to draw politically convenient but simplistic
conclusions from a historical record that is "muddled and provides no clear answer in favor of
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V
Adopting any standard of this sort would raise questions. Some of these
can be considered fairly briefly. For example, it is worth considering what
the standard would not do. It would not transform the trial into a witch hunt
through a scholar's footnotes in search of the inevitable error.77 The Irving
trial was not about making mistakes; it was about the pattern of those
mistakes and what it revealed about Irving's intent. 7' Nor would the
standard involve evaluation of scholarship by canons of interpretation
entirely different from those employed within the academy; in fact, Evans
concluded that " [a]s it turned out, the rules of evidence in court were not so
different from the rules of evidence observed by historians." 79 Nor, finally,
should it be taken as an exhaustive listing of possible methodological
problems.80 Other criticisms, however, merit more extended consideration,
including a possible bias toward the status quo and against progressive uses
of history, and doubts about the standard's practicality.
The decision in Irving validated a widely accepted conventional history
and criticized an idiosyncratic and controversial challenge to that account.
Is the "conscientious historian" standard therefore biased in favor of
maintenance of the status quo? To the extent that recent progressive use of
history in legal controversies has often been "history from below," that is,
either side"); Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 437 (1995) (suggesting that history does not yield unproblematic conclusions).
77. One of Irving's ambivalent defenders, Donald Cameron Watt, a retired professor of
diplomatic history at London School of Economics and editor of Mein Kampf, raised this specter
in an editorial published immediately after the verdict suggesting that no historian's scholarship
could stand up to the searching examination directed at Irving's publications. Evans argued in
response that Irving's errors were distinctive in their pattern of manipulation, and outstripped
mere carelessness. EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 245-48.
78. Penguin's solicitors emphasized that evidence of a pattern of distortions, "all tend[ing] in
one direction-the exculpation of Hitler and the sanitisation of the Nazi regime," was crucial to
supporting Lipstadt's writings. Anthony Julius & James Libson, Losing Was Unthinkable, the
Rest Is History, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 18, 2000, Features, at 11. Their evaluation was
confirmed by Lord Justice Stephen Sedley in his refusal of Irving's appeal. Sedley noted that
"[w]hat might, in another historian have been casual misreadings of evidence, emerge in the
applicant's case as sedulous misinterpretation all going in the direction of his racial and
ideological leanings. Hence the verdict for the defendants." Denial of Permission To Appeal,
Irving v. Penguin Books (Dec. 18, 2000), available at http://www.fpp.co.uk/Legal/Penguin/
Appeal/refusal.html (Irving's website).
79. EVANS, LYING, supra note 3, at 190. Evans also noted, however, that his observation
applied specifically to civil suits. Id. The experience of recent war crimes trials suggests that
historians may find a greater disparity between legal and historical standards regarding evidence
in criminal trials. See DAVID BEVAN, A CASE To ANSWER: THE STORY OF AUSTRALIA'S FIRST
EUROPEAN WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION 223-26 (1994); Vea Ranki, Holocaust History and the
Law, 9 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15, 32-35 (1997).
80. One addition to the "conscientious historian" standard might read "(8) she must be
aware of the specific time frame of all evidence, and must not support propositions solely with
evidence derived from other time periods." Irving, for all his flaws, largely maintained such a
sensitivity to chronology. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for all American judges and
lawyers. E.g., supra note 75.
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attempts to recover overlooked narratives and the historical experience of
the less powerful,8' the "conscientious historian" standard may impede the
use of historical evidence for progressive causes. This conservative
tendency, however, could and should be counterbalanced by an equally
rigorous application of the standard to "traditional" narratives. The
"conscientious historian" standard calls for the searching consideration of
all the evidence a historian can feasibly consult-not simply all the
evidence that supports the dominant narrative. Irving embodies the danger
of illegitimately excluding evidence that may conflict with a researcher's
hypothesis. By contrast, the "conscientious historian" should embrace
complexity, and courts should follow suit. 2
One might also wonder how easy it would be to apply the
"conscientious historian" standard in practice. Penguin's research effort
took some four years.83 While the extent of Irving's collected works (thirty
books and numerous articles and speeches) and the difficulty of the sources
involved (Nazi documents, for example, deliberately employed euphemism
to conceal the extermination program) arguably made the Irving case
particularly complex, other cases would doubtlessly pose thorny issues as
well. The judge's ability to inquire into these questions is also limited by a
dependence on the parties to provide a documentary record.' Faced with
practical dilemmas on this scale, trial courts may very well revert to pre-
Daubert practice,85 and restrict their investigation to the question of the
expert's formal qualifications. Indeed, the imperative of inquiry into
methodology may prove to be a millstone for the Court's attempted reform
in Daubert and Kumho.
Until the moment of retrenchment arrives, however, the Irving trial's
"conscientious historian" standard represents one of the only judicially
81. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Martha Minow & Hendrik Hartog, Introduction: Legal
Histories from Below, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 7 9. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Past as
Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal
Argument, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 339, 350-53 (Terrence J. McDonald
ed., 1996) (describing the "bottom up" perspective of radical-populist historians and radical legal
historians); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of
History, 13 J.L. & POLITICS 809, 817 (1997) (discussing the influence of "hidden histories").
82. One historian who frequently testified as an expert witness in Indian cases offered an
example of how an attentive approach to historical methodology might have led to a more
progressive outcome: In Indian cases, courts have frequently expressed a preference for
government documents over other sorts of historical evidence, apparently heedless of government
agents' tendency to conceal misbehavior in these reports. Tanner, supra note 31, at 698-99.
Attention to motive, as well as to the range of available evidence, as called for by the
"conscientious historian" standard, would enable courts to avoid this pitfall.
83. Dodd, supra note 9.
84. See, e.g., PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT
AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 131-32 (1997) (noting that "[t]he judge in the courtroom differs from
the historian in one fundamental aspect: he is not in charge of the research. The parties decide
which materials are presented").
85. See Garber, supra note 50, at 6.
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recognized guidelines for evaluating historical research. While not
specifically designed for the purpose of evaluating expert testimony, the
"conscientious historian" standard could serve a pedagogical function even
if it were rarely employed as a do-it-yourself guide to historical
investigation. Encouraging judges to follow historians' own standards
would both realize the methodological focus of Daubert and prevent ill-
conceived exclusion of historical evidence.
-Wendie Ellen Schneider

